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Judicial Supervision of Legislative 
Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal 
Protection? 
Edward L. Barrett, Jr. * 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' the United States Supreme Court 
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal pro- 
tection of the laws "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." 
Nine decades later, however, neither the members of the Su- 
preme Court nor constitutional law scholars are able to find sub- 
stantial agreement as to how far the courts should go in invalidat- 
ing legislation2 because it is not "equal." This lack of agreement 
is not surprising since judicial review under the equal protection 
clause raises broad problems as to the respective roles of courts 
and legislatures. 
Judicial review of legislation has long been a settled feature 
of our government ~ t r u c t u r e . ~  The Constitution imposes a wide 
variety of constraints upon the legislative process that operate as 
guidelines for the exercise of judicial review. Many of these con- 
straints are relatively specific-"No Person shall be a Represent- 
ative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five 
Yearsv4-and have posed no problems for the courts. Most of the 
litigation, however, has resulted from the broader constitutional 
provisions that, in effect, designate certain interests as protected. 
For example, the commerce clause has been construed as protect- 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of John Poulos, Carol Bruch, 
and Jean Love in commenting on early drafts of this article. 
1. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
2. For convenience, this article uses the general term legislation to encompass all 
forms of legislative activity-federal, state, and local. Lawmaking that takes the form of 
administrative rule-making or other less formal methods of creating law is ignored. It is 
assumed that the Fifth Amendment imposes the substance of the equal protection limita- 
tion on the federal government. 
No attempt has been made to adorn this "think-piece" with elaborate footnote docu- 
mentation. The discussion is limited to the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court. 
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), marked the beginning of 
judicial review in this country. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, 9 2. 
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ing the interest in freedom of trade among the states.The First 
Amendment protects the interest, among others, in freedom of 
speech and the press; the Fourth Amendment, the interest in 
privacy of person, premises, and possessions against indiscrimi- 
nate official interference; and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
taken together, the interest in providing a fair trial for persons 
accused of crime. The effect of constitutional provisions such as 
these is to invalidate legislation that conflicts with the protected 
interest. When such legislation is challenged in court, the judici- 
ary faces the difficult task of interpreting and applying the rele- 
vant constitutional provisions to the legislation. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provision that no state shall 
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws," however, does not describe such an easily definable 
protected interest, and thus raises a number of difficult analytical 
problems. I t  can be interpreted as protecting the interest in 
equality, as implied by the assertion in Yick Wo that it consti- 
tutes a pledge of the protection of "equal laws." Yet it is clear 
that it cannot be a guarantee that every law shall apply equally 
to every person, for almost all legislation involves classifications 
placing special burdens on or granting special benefits to individ- 
uals or groups. Hence, the Supreme Court has held from the 
beginning that the clause "does not deny to States the power to 
treat different classes of persons in different ways? But if equal 
protection does not deny the power to classify-to treat different 
classes of people in different ways-then what is its effect? 
The Supreme Court today finds in the equal protection 
clause three analytically separate limitations on legislative 
power. First, the Court holds that certain bases for classification 
may be used, if at  all, only in unusual circumstances-they are 
"suspect" classifications. In one of the earliest cases, the Court 
said of the equal protection clause: "What is this but declaring 
that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for 
the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand 
equal before the laws of the States . . . ."' Later, it extended the 
protection to prohibit classification based generally on race or 
5. See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U S .  20 (1974). 
6. Reed v. Reed, 404 U S .  71, 75 (1971). For a recent article asserting that the equal 
protection clause creates a value of "constitutional equality" and that the focus of the 
Court should be on determining the categories of equality which courts should enforce see 
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of 
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975). 
7. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880). 
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nationality? More recently, i t  has proscribed classifications 
based on alienageg and, arguably, those based on sexl%nd illegiti- 
macy.I1 In effect, the Court is saying that equal protection consti- 
tutes a guarantee of "equal laws" to the extent that it substan- 
tially limits the power of legislatures to use certain bases for 
classification. 
The Court has not clarified the circumstances under which 
suspect classifications may be justified. It has said that such 
classifications must be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny,"I2 
but has not made it clear whether the classifications are per se 
invalid or whether they may be sustained if necessary to achieve 
a legitimate state objective. Even if they may be sustained, the 
questions of how important the state interest must be, and how 
closely related the classification must be to that interest, have not 
been answered.13 Also undefined is the standard used to deter- 
mine whether a particular classifying trait is "suspect." 
Second, the Supreme Court holds that legislative classifica- 
tions which burden constitutionally protected interestsI4 are in- 
valid if not closely related to important or substantial govern- 
mental objectives. The rule as articulated by the Court is that a 
classification burdening a protected interest unconstitutionally 
denies equal protection unless it can be demonstrated that the 
classification advances a "compelling" state interest, that it is 
closely related to that state interest, and that a less burdensome 
classification would not adequately serve the governmental inter- 
est. 'This second limitation applies whether or not the legislature 
8. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 374 (1886). 
9. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see discussion in Section 11, C, 1, infra. 
10. See discussion in Section 11, C, 2, infra. 
11. See discussion in Section 11, C, 3, infra. 
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
13. For an excellent analysis of these issues see P. BREST, PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECI- 
SION MAKING-CASES AND MATERIALS 477-92 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BREST]. 
14. The Court has also characterized this doctrine as applying when the classification 
burdens a fundamental interest. Apparently the Court now utilizes the term fundamental 
in this context to mean only interests "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu- 
tion." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). This issue 
is further discussed in Section III infra. 
15. See, e.g., the formulation in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 
258 (1974). 
Mr. John Poulos contributed a number of ideas to this article. One of his criticisms 
has, however, increased the awkwardness of expression apparent a t  many points. The 
Court usually speaks of the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to speak, and so 
forth, and it is easy to use such terminology. As Poulos notes, however, the word right 
represents the conclusion one reaches after determining that the constitutionally pro- 
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uses a constitutionally suspect classifying trait. A number of 
questions are raised by this formulation. What does equal protec- 
tion analysis add to the substantive constitutional protection of 
the interest? How substantial must the burden on the protected 
interest be? How important must the asserted governmental 
interest be? How close must the relationship be between the 
classification and the state interest? What is the scope of the 
protection afforded under this approach? 
Third, the Court holds that legislation may be invalid when 
a classification made therein is not rationally related to a legiti- 
mate state purpose. While equal protection does not deny the 
right to classify, it does deny 
the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to 
persons placed by a statute. into different classes on the basis of 
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A clas- 
sification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest 
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons simi- 
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike. "I6 
This limitation applies whether or not the legislature uses a con- 
stitutionally suspect classification or burdens a constitutionally 
protected interest. The major question under this analysis is the 
extent of the protection accorded to the interest in freedom from 
irrational classifications. To what extent does this third limita- 
tion require legislatures to identify social goals and make only 
those classifications that are rationally related to those goals? 
Three cases will serve to illustrate the distinctions among 
these applications of equal protection. In the first, a statute ex- 
cluding resident aliens from the receipt of welfare benefits was 
held invalid because "classifications based on alienage, like those 
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject 
to close judicial scrutiny."17 In the second, a statute denying wel- 
fare assistance to residents who had not resided within the state 
for a year was held invalid because i t  served "to penalize the 
exercise" of the constitutionally protected "right" to travel and 
tected interest is important enough to outweight the legislative interest which supports 
the particular burden. Therefore, this article uses the term interests rather than rights 
except where quoting from the Court. 
16. Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71, 75-76 (1971) (citation omitted). 
17. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (footnotes omitted). 
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the state had not shown that the statutory scheme was "neces- 
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest."18 Finally, 
a statute providing lower welfare payments for dependent 
children than for the aged was upheld because i t  did not use a 
suspect classification, burden a constitutionally protected inter- 
est, or fail the general test of rationality-there was some rela- 
tionship between the classification and the state objective.Ig 
As noted above, each of these three approaches raises a series 
of questions. It is the purpose of this article to analyze each ap- 
proach in light of these questions. The article proceeds from a 
point of view generally favoring confinement of judicial review to 
the application of those constraints upon legislation that can be 
found, in some principled manner, in the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~  As will 
be seen, the conclusion that equal protection should play a more 
modest role is not necessarily a conclusion that the courts should 
not extend similar protections through application of other con- 
stitutional provisions. 
A. The General Scope of the Doctrine 
What is the general scope of the protection afforded by the 
doctrine that equal protection makes certain classifying traits 
constitutionally "suspect?" Essentially, the protection forbids all 
legislation which discriminates against-singles out for special 
treatment-those possessing a certain trait. I t  should not matter 
whether the burden imposed is large or small since the evil is in 
the use of the clas~ification.~' Conversely, since the suspect classi- 
fication doctrine applies only when the trait is used as a basis for 
imposing a burden, the doctrine should not serve to invalidate 
legislation that imposes even severe burdens on persons possess- 
ing the classifying trait, provided it also imposes the same bur- 
dens on others.22 Hence, this doctrine is quite distinct from the 
-- 
18. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U S .  618, 634 (1969). 
19. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546, 549 (1972). 
20. The author first became aware of constitutional problems a t  a time when the 
Court was using expansive interpretations of equal protection and due process largely to 
protect economic vested interests-a fact which has left a lingering suspicion that gener- 
ally the courts may not be relied upon to serve the people's interests any better than do 
the political processes. In any event, the analysis which follows hopefully will be useful 
even to those who seek a more activist role for the courts. 
21. The Court analyzed the problem in almost this fashion in Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
22. The point is involved in cases where the Court denies a claim under equal protec- 
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more common constitutional provisions that extend substantive 
protection to particular interests. First Amendment cases illus- 
trate this distinction. A law requiring only particular ethnic or- 
ganizations to obtain a permit from the chief of police before 
using a public park for meetings would be invalid under suspect 
classification analysis because it makes a classification based on 
race or national origin, and under First Amendment analysis be- 
cause it unduly burdens the exercise of First Amendment rights.2R 
But a law requiring any group to obtain a permit from the chief 
of police before using the public park for a meeting might be held 
invalid as unduly burdening First Amendment interests in its 
application to an ethnic organization or any other organization 
seeking to use the park for political meetings, even though it does 
not single out either ethnic .or political groups for special treat- 
ment .24 
A major question posed by suspect classification analysis is 
whether there are any situations in which legislation utilizing a 
suspect classification can be upheld. In analogous cases involving 
constitutionally protected interests the Supreme Court has said, 
in effect, that legislation discriminating against the interests will 
be held invalid without concern as to the extent of the burden 
imposed. Should the result be the same when a suspect classifi- 
cation is involved? In recent decades, the Court has not upheld 
any legislation utilizing a suspect classifi~ation.~ It  has said, 
however, that such a classification might be upheld if the state 
demonstrates that the classification is necessary to the attain- 
ment of' an important or "compelling" state interest.26 
Since the suspect classification doctrine began with race, this 
article will first examine these questions in the context of racial 
classifications. Thereafter, the article will examine the same 
questions, as well as the question of which classifications beyond 
race are constitutionally suspect, in the context of classifications 
related to alienage, sex, and illegitimacy. 
tion because the complainant failed to show that a classification was in fact based on race. 
See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,620 (1974); 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965). 
23. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
24. See, e.g., Love11 v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). 
25. The only case in which the Court clearly has done so is Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
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B. Racial Classifications 
The equal protection clause was clearly intended to invali- 
date a t  least certain racial  classification^.^^ In the first case aris- 
ing under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court said: 
[I]t is not difficult to give a meaning to [the equal protec- 
tion] clause. The existence of laws in the States where the 
newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with 
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil 
to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbid- 
den.28 
A few years later, in Strauder v. West V i r g i n i ~ , ~ ~  the Court invali- 
dated a law limiting jury service to white persons. I t  said of the 
clause: 
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall 
be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, 
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the 
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection 
the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination 
shall be made against them by law because of their color?3o 
While these cases could have been read as holding only that 
the black race is a constitutionally suspect classification, the 
Court soon extended the interpretation to include classifications 
based on other races and nati~nalities.~'  The Court now states 
that the "clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial 
discrimination in the  state^."^^ 
What is the scope of this doctrine? Does it forbid all racial 
classifications, or does i t  permit them to some extent? In 
Korematsu v. United States,33 the only case in which the Court 
has directly upheld a racial classification, the Court said: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi- 
27. See generally Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection 
of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421. 
28. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U S .  (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). 
29. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
30. Id. at 307. 
31. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U S .  356, 369, 374 (1886). See also Graham v. Richard- 
son, 403 U S .  363, 372 (1971) (assertion that classifications based "on nationality or race" 
are inherently suspect). 
32. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U S .  1, 10 (1967). 
33. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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ately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It  is to say that courts must subject them to 
the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may some- 
times justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antago- 
nism never can.34 
More recently, the Court stated in Loving v. Virginia:" 
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands 
that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the "most rigid 
scrutiny," . . . and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be 
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissi- 
ble state objective, independent of the racial discrimination 
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elimi- 
nate.36 
Given that  racial classifications are not prohibited abso- 
lutely, when might such classifications be permitted? Two nar- 
rowly limited types of cases appear to justify racial classifications 
without detracting from the policy considerations that make such 
classifications suspect. The first type of case involves situations 
in which race is substantially congruent with some significanv7 
social policy. If it can be shown, for example, that a particular 
disease is almost wholly confined to members of a particular ra- 
cial group, it should not be a violation of equal protection to limit 
to members of that group the regulations necessary to prevent the 
disease from ~ p r e a d i n g . ~ ~  The second type of case involves a racial 
classification, used only for the duration of an emergency, that is 
the only available classification to avert a serious public danger. 
For example, if a race riot erupts in a prison, it should be permis- 
sible to immediately separate the races until it is possible to 
identify and deal with the troublemakers on a nonracial basis.3g 
But beyond cases of these types, should a state be permitted 
to use racial classifications where it can show that there is a close 
34. Id. at  216. 
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
36. Id. a t  11. 
37. This limitation is important. The point is discussed in BREST, supra note 13, at 
488-89. 
38. There may be, of course, other constitutional objections to such a program. See, 
e.g., Comment, Constitutional and Practical Considerations in Mandatory Sickle Cell 
Anemia Testing, 7 U.C.D.L. REV. 509 (1974). 
39. The point is discussed in Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of 
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP.  CT. REV. 1, 25-26 [hereinafter cited 
as Posner]. If the result in Korematsu is justifiable, it is on an application of this princi- 
ple. I t  does not derogate from the principle itself to believe that the facts did not warrant 
its application there. 
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correlation between race and an important state objective? In 
cases involving racial segregation, the Court has long held that 
such segregation cannot be justified by showing that it will pre- 
vent violence and disorder in the c~mmunity. '~ The current situa- 
tions in Boston and Louisville4' demonstrate that a community 
can have very important interests a t  stake that could be pro- 
tected by permitting the continuance of segregation found by the 
courts to be unconstitutionally discriminatory. Yet the courts 
have clearly held that such interests are not sufficiently compel- 
ling to justify continuing the discrimination. 
A similar situation relating to the constitutionality of racial 
classification involves the validity of so-called "benign discrimi- 
nation."42 For example, can legislation designed to aid minority 
racial groups be upheld? If so, on what theory? Most commenta- 
tors have suggested that the constitutional question should be 
resolved in terms of the relationship of the classification to the 
state objective and the importance of that objective. Supporters 
of benign discrimination have suggested that the showing of a 
close relationship either to a compelling state interest or, less 
rigidly, to a substantial or significant state interest, might justify 
the use of racial  classification^.^^ One commentator has gone fur- 
ther and argued that racial classifications made by a white major- 
ity to its own disadvantage should be upheld upon a mere show- 
ing of some relationship to a legitimate state interested4 
The difficulty with these formulations is that they appear to 
relax significantly the general standards by which suspect classi- 
fications have been judged. If a state interest in expanding the 
opportunities for a disadvantaged racial group is sufficiently im- 
portant to justify imposing burdens on others because of their 
race, why is not the state interest in preventing violence and 
bloodshed sufficient to justify the discrimination involved in per- 
petuating a neighborhood school policy in Boston?" Of course, if 
- -- - 
40. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 
60, 81 (1917). 
41. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1976, a t  4, col. 2. 
42. See Posner, supra note 39; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: 
Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975). 
43. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law 
School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975); Karst & Horwitz, Affirmative Action 
and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher 
Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974); O'Neil, After Defunis: Filling 
the Constitutional Vacuum, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 315 (1975). 
44. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 
723 (1974). 
45. For a useful exposition of the point of view that benign discriminations violate 
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the equal protection clause were held, as the Court originally 
suggested, to make suspect only legislation discriminating 
against the black race, or by reasonable extension, other minority 
races subjected to community discrimination, this problem would 
disappear. Just  as the privileges and immunities clause pro- 
scribes placing special burdens on nonresident citizens but per- 
mits placing special burdens on residents, so equal protection 
could be construed as not rendering suspect those classifications 
that burden majority or advantaged races. Both judicial decisions 
and wise policy, however, appear to militate against adopting 
such a restrictive meaning for equal protection in the context of 
racial classifications. 
Another approach is possible that arguably would permit 
some forms of benign discrimination without running afoul of the 
basic values underlying the doctrine that race is a suspect classifi- 
cation. The original intention of equal protection was to protect 
the former slaves from discriminatory legislation. From this his- 
tory, it is possible to generalize as a constitutional goal a society 
in which race is irrelevant as a basis for governmental action. 
Given this goal, some classifications based on race may be justifi- 
able to the extent and for the period necessary to compensate for 
the effects of past discrimination and to bring a racial group to a 
social, political, and economic level a t  which the treatment of 
race as irrelevant will not leave the group a t  a disadvantage. The 
Supreme Court has taken this approach in school desegregation 
cases, holding that racial classifications may be used to eliminate 
the effects of past official discrimination." One could move be- 
yond these cases to argue more broadly that where members of a 
racial group are not fairly represented in the community-in edu- 
cation, employment, and housing-because of a history of com- 
munity (if not overt governmental) discrimination, then legisla- 
tion designed to assist that group to achieve fair representation 
is consistent with equal protection. 
Even this argument for upholding some benign discrimina- 
equal protection see Posner, supra note 39. For an elaborate rejoinder to Posner see 
Sandalow, supra note 42. Sandalow suggests that an argument can be made for using race 
as a basis for preferential law school admissions policies, not because race is equated with 
deprivation, but because race is socially significant, and important community values can 
be served only by achieving a substantial representation of certain racial groups in law 
schools and eventually in the bar. On this basis, racial preferences might be the only 
feasible means of achieving the goal. Id. a t  682-92. 
46. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U S .  1 (1971). 
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tion creates a number of difficult problems. Must such affirma- 
tive assistance be limited to those members of the discriminated 
group who are still suffering from the discrimination, or can i t  be 
given solely on the basis of the possession of the racial character- 
istic? That is, can special assistance be provided only to poor and 
deprived members of the minority group, or may it be given to 
all? How long is the preference justified? In other words, when has 
the group achieved sufficient parity with other groups that the 
need for preference ends? How are allocations of limited resources 
to be made among competing disadvantaged groups? How sub- 
stantial shall the preference be? Is parity to be achieved rapidly 
or slowly? This last question can also be phrased in terms of how 
much of the burden of past discrimination must be discharged by 
the present generation. These are incredibly difficult problems 
that are currently being addressed in a fumbling fashion a t  the 
administrative level with little guidance from the courts and none 
from the Supreme Court/' 
In any event, more careful analysis would facilitate the pro- 
per disposition of cases involving racial classifications. Since the 
Court in recent years has not found any racial classificationsM to 
be constitutional, one can argue that the issue is not significant. 
But as the pressure to recognize some forms of racial classifica- 
tions, particularly benign classifications, is felt, careful analysis 
will be necessary. If the Court is to permit some forms of racial 
classification, it must do so on the narrowest possible grounds if 
it is not to reverse history and provide constitutional justification 
for forms of discrimination now clearly forbidden. 
C. Other Suspect Classifications 
The language of the equal protection clause gives no basis for 
treating some but not other classifications as suspect. The history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, supports the conclusion 
that the clause was intended to restrict the use of race as a classi- 
fying factor. Upon what basis, then, can it be determined whether 
other classifying factors should be singled out as constitutionally 
suspect? 
47. The only significant discussion of any of these problems a t  the level of the Su- 
preme Court is found in Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 
320 (1974). A majority of the Court found the case to be moot and did not reach the merits. 
48. The problem most litigated is the difficult threshold issue whether the classi- 
fication challenged was in fact based on race. See, e .g . ,  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 
(1974); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 
(1972); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
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The answer depends largely on how one reads the basic poli- 
cies underlying the intent to limit racial classifications. If racial 
classifications were made suspect because race is an immutable 
and involuntary characteristic of individuals, then the list of clas- 
sifications potentially subject to being treated as suspect is long. 
Sex, height, age, illegitimacy, physical disabilities, and intellig- 
ence are all relatively immutable and involuntary characteristics, 
yet it is quite clear that at  least some of them are commonly used 
in legislative classifications. It can be argued, however, that race 
is a suspect classification not only because it is an immutable 
characteristic but also because it is rarely relevant to a nondiscri- 
minatory legislative purpose. According to this line of reasoning, 
sex classifications, for example, would be suspect because they 
are often not relevant to a legitimate legislative purpose;%ge 
classifications, on the other hand, would not be suspect because 
of the many clearly relevant reasons for singling out at  least the 
very young and the very old for special treatment. 
If one asserts, however, that equal protection is intended to 
give special protection to members of groups that have suffered 
a history of community discrimination" or to members of a "dis- 
crete and insular" minority," the problem is more complex. Such 
an approach suggests that race classifications should be held in- 
valid only when they burden members of disadvantaged minority 
races. With respect to sex, this approach would justify invalidat- 
ing only classifications burdening females, since only women have 
suffered a history of community discrimination, and neither sex 
can be said to be a "discrete and insular" minority. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not dearly identified 
the basis for its decisions to label some classifications, other than 
racial, as "suspect." An examination of those classifications that 
have been held suspect or appear likely to be held suspect in the 
future will illustrate the problem. 
1. Alienage 
To date, a majority of the Court has explicitly recognized 
only one classification other than race as suspect-alienage. In 
Graham v. R i ~ h a r d s o n , ~ ~  the Court held that 
49. See, e .g . ,  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U S .  677, 686 (1973). 
50. Id. at 684. 
51. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U S .  365, 372 (1971). 
52. Id. at 365. 
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classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality 
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scru- 
tiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and 
insular" minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solici- 
tude is app ro~ r i a t e .~~  
The Court's analysis suggests that only classifications discrimi- 
nating against aliens are suspect. Classifications which benefit 
aliens and impose burdens on citizens presumably are not sus- 
pect. 
In many ways, however, the alienage cases do not fit comfort- 
ably into the suspect classification mold. While the Court has 
invalidated state legislation limiting welfare payments to aliens,54 
excluding them from government j o b ~ , ~ h n d  refusing to license 
them as lawyers," it has recognized that states may deny aliens 
the right to vote and to hold an appropriately defined class of 
important public positions.57 Even the Constitution distinguishes 
in many places between aliens and citizens," and the Court has 
held that Congress has broad powers to determine which aliens 
may immigrate to the United States, the terms and conditions 
under which they may remain, and the conditions of their natu- 
r a l i z a t i ~ n . ~ ~  It seems inconsistent to hold aliens subject to such a 
wide variety of governmental regulations singling them out for 
special treatment, and yet a t  the same time hold that alienage 
constitutes a suspect classification. Arguably, it would be more 
consistent with the constitutional structure for the Court to deal 
with these cases under the supremacy clause.60 Congress has 
broad powers over aliens, and when it determines that they shall 
be admitted to permanent residence, state regulations excluding 
them from access to a t  least the ordinary means of economic 
survival in the community can be invalidated as inconsistent 
with the congressional determination? In this context, the ap- 
- - 
53. Id. at%% 
54. Id. at  383. 
55. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
56. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
57. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-48 (1973). 
58. The point is discussed by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Sugarman, id. a t  
651. 
59. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971). 
60. See DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976). 
61. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948), the Court relied 
principally on a federal preclusion argument. Equal protection was mentioned, but the 
reference may have related to the fact that the alienage classification also classified by 
race. In Graham, federal preclusion was an alternative ground of decision. 403 U.S. 365, 
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proach could be similar to that taken under the commerce clause, 
wherein state regulation of commerce is invalidated when found 
to conflict with an express or implied policy of Congress." Using 
a suspect classification approach limited only to certain kinds of 
regulations makes it difficult for courts to distinguish in a 
principled way alienage classifications that are constitutionally 
permissible from those that are not.63 
2. Sex 
The latest candidate for inclusion in the list of suspect classi- 
fications is sex. Of the six sex-discrimination cases decided in the 
past four years, the Court held the legislation invalid in the four 
cases in which the classification disadvantaged females,'l but 
upheld it in the two cases in which the classification benefitted 
females? A majority of the Court asserts that it has not decided 
whether sex is a suspect classification; in each case where legisla- 
tion was found invalid, the Court held that the offending classifi- 
cation did not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
objective. In the latest of these cases, Stanton v. Stanton," the 
Court held invalid a Utah law requiring a divorced father to sup- 
port male children to age 21, but female children only to age 18, 
stating: 
376-77. The Court also indicated, however, that Congress could not specifically authorize 
the states to impose restrictions on aliens because it "does not have the power to authorize 
the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 382. Neither 
Sugarman nor Grifiths mentioned the federal preclusion ground, relying wholly on equal 
protection. 
62. See, e.g. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). 
63. The Supreme Court will face such a problem this year when it hears Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted 417 U S .  944 (1974), restored 
to the calendar for reargument, 420 U.S. 959 (1975). For a discussion of the problems 
raised by Hampton see Comment, Aliens and the Federal Government: A Newer Equal 
Protection, 8 U.C.D.L. REV. 1 (1975). 
64. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U S .  7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U S .  636 
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
The Court did reject a challenge to a state disability insurance system that excluded the 
disabilities resulting from normal pregnancy, but analyzed the case as not making a 
classification based on sex. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). The Court 
said that the legislation, in excluding disability payments to workers for disability result- 
ing from normal pregnancy, divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women 
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes 
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to 
members of both sexes. For an argument to the contrary see Comment, Pregnancy and 
the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1974). 
65. Schlesigner v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 499 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U S .  351 (1974). 
66. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
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We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a 
classification based on sex is inherently suspect. . . . 
. . . . 
We therefore conclude tha t  under any test-compelling 
state interest, or rational basis, or something in between-[the 
statute] . . . does not survive an equal protection attackafi7 
Despite this rhetoric, it appears that the Court is in fact 
treating a t  least female sex as a suspect classification. For exam- 
ple, the first of the six sex classification cases, Reed v. Reed," is 
most easily explained as a suspect classification case. The legisla- 
tion established classes of persons entitled to administer the es- 
tate of intestates and provided that where several persons were 
equally entitled to the right, males must be preferred to females. 
The state argued that this classification was justified because it 
reduced the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class 
of contests. The Court said the question was whether the classifi- 
cation bore "a rational relation to a state objective." It recognized 
that reducing workload was an objective of "some legit irna~y,"~~ 
but instead of determining the question of rational relati~nship,'~ 
the Court said that: 
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex 
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimina- 
tion of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbi- 
trary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection 
Clause. . . . 71 
This holding suggests tha t  sex is a suspect classification and 
therefore invalid. Choice by lot, although equally unrelated to 
the ability to administer, would be held valid. Thus, the holding 
turns not on the relationship between the classification and the 
objective, but instead upon the utilization of a suspect, as op- 
posed to a nonsuspect, classification to achieve the objective. 
Since Reed, the Court's opinions have failed to articulate a 
satisfactory rationale for the results reached. In the second case 
involving a sex classification, Frontiero v. Richardson, 72 Justice 
Brennan, speaking for a plurality of the Court, argued that sex 
67. Id. at 13, 17. 
68. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
69. Id. at 76. 
70. Presumably, any criteria for selection other than relative merits as an administra- 
tor, whether lot, sex, age, residence, or citizenship, would equally relate to the goal of 
reducing workload. 
71. 404 U.S. at 76 (1971). 
72. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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should be treated as a suspect classification. The reasons he gives 
for his conclusion, however, appear to support the more limited 
position that only those classifications burdening women are sus- 
pect. He notes that the country has "had a long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination," but immediately makes it clear 
that he means a history of discrimination against This 
history, he says, is one reason for making sex a suspect classifica- 
tion. He goes on to say that because "sex, like race and national 
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the 
accident of birth," the imposition of special burdens on members 
of a particular sex should be held invalid." He then notes that 
what "differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intel- 
ligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized 
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to ~oc ie ty . "~But  this 
argument, which would support making all sex classifications 
suspect, is confused by his conclusion that statutory distinctions 
between the sexes "often have the effect of invidiously relegat- 
ing the entire class of females to inferior legal status without 
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members."'" 
The later cases also fail to clarify the Court's rationale. In 
Kahn v. S h e ~ i n , ' ~  the Court upheld legislation granting a special 
tax exemption for widows. Justice Douglas, who had joined Jus- 
tice Brennan in his Frontiero opinion, wrote for the Court that no 
more than minimal rationality was required because states have 
always been given "large leeway" in making tax  classification^.^^ 
Justice White, who had also joined the Brennan opinion in 
Frontiero, dissented, arguing in effect that all sex classifications, 
not just those discriminating against women, were suspect. Jus- 
tice Brennan also dissented, arguing that a policy of providing 
73. Id. at 684. 
74. Id. at 686. 
75. Id. (footnote omitted). 
76. Id. at 687. 
77. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
78. Id. at 355. This opinion can almost be taken as holding that male sex is not a 
suspect classification. Cf. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 US. 656 (1975), holding invalid 
a special tax on the incomes of nonresidents as violative of the privileges and immunities 
clause. There the Court said that tax classifications are tested by a stricter standard when 
a constitutionally protected interest is burdened: 
When a tax measure is challenged as an undue burden on an activity granted 
special constitutional recognition, however, the appropriate degree of inquiry is 
that necessary to protect the competing constitutional value from erosion. 
Id. at 662. 
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special benefits for needy women who had been subject to a his- 
tory "of purposeful discrimination and neglect" was proper, but 
said that the statute should be held invalid because it extended 
the protection to all widows rather than just to needy widows.79 
In Schlesinger v. Ballard,80 the Court upheld a military regu- 
lation allowing women line officers to avoid mandatory discharge 
for a longer period of service in one rank without promotion t h a ~  
the period allowed for men. A majority of the Court upheld the 
regulation as rationally related to the problem that women had 
fewer opportunities for advancement because they were not eligi- 
ble for combat missions or sea duty. Justice Brennan, in dissent, 
examined the legislation and determined that the purpose of the 
legislation could not have been compensatory. He therefore con- 
cluded that a permissible basis for the discrimination did not 
exist 
In Weinberger v. Wie~enfeld ,~~ the Court held invalid a sec- 
tion of the Social Security Act that provided that benefits based 
on the death of a covered wife were payable only to her children, 
while benefits based on the death of a covered husband were 
payable to his surviving spouse as well as the children. Justice 
Brennan, speaking for the Court, recognized that there was em- 
pirical support for the conclusion that men are more likely than 
women to be primary supporters of their spouses and children, 
but said that "such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice 
to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and 
whose earnings contribute significantly to their families' sup- 
p~rt."~%gain, he seems to say that sex is a suspect classification, 
but uses language suggesting that it is the "denigration of the 
efforts of women" which is the basis for the result. 
Finally, in Stanton v. Stant~n,~"he Court held that a state 
could not require parental support obligations to males until age 
21 but to females only until age 18. The Court found it unneces- 
sary to decide whether classifications based on sex are suspect; 
rather, i t  opted to follow the Reed holding that to be valid a 
classification must be reasonable and rest upon a ground or dif- 
ference substantially related to the object of the legislation. 
Applying this standard, the Court rejected an attempt to justify 
79. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974). 
80. 419 U.S. 499 (1975). 
81. Id. at 520. 
82. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
83. Id. at 645. 
84. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
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the distinction on the ground that education was more necessary 
for boys, who had the responsibility to provide a home. The Court 
asserted that such a distinction reflected "the role-typing society 
has long imposed" on women.85 
One can debate whether there is a principled basis for finding 
sex classifications to be suspect under equal p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Cer-
tainly elimination of sex bias was not one of the purposes of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment?' The second section of 
the amendment recognized a right to restrict voting to males,xx 
and it took the Nineteenth Amendment to eliminate sex as a 
qualification for voting. Yet it can be argued that in important 
respects women have suffered a history of community discrimina- 
tion that, by analogy to the situation of minority races, justifies 
making a t  least female sex a suspect classification. Such a limita- 
tion to female sex fits closely with what the Court has been doing, 
if not with what it has been saying. If this is the appropriate 
analysis, then the most significant difference between equal pro- 
tection and the proposed Equal Rights AmendmentRg may be that 
--- -- - 
85. Id. a t  15. 
86. For an excellent and balanced discussion see Ginsburg, Gender and the 
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
Frequently this question and similar ones are answered in terms which suggest that 
it is the duty of courts to eliminate all bad or unwise legislation. See, e.g., Johnson, Sex 
L)iscrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 617 (1974): 
Remedies [for those seeking gender equality] are available, if judges can 
only be persuaded to use them. It is an awesome task to convince a comfortable 
and overwhelmingly male judiciary that the existing pattern of legally-enforced 
sex discrimination is so pernicious as to violate the federal Constitution. The 
effort is gathering momentum, as increasing numbers of judges join those who 
have already recognized this anachronistic culture excrescence for what it is: 
stupid, wasteful and morally reprehensible. 
. . . .  
Suppression of the efforts of people to lead independent lives is not among 
the legitimate powers of government. In our system, responsibility for the ulti- 
mate vindication of this truth lies with the courts. In the area of sex discrimina- 
tion, the recent performance of the Supreme Court has ranged from acceptable 
to inexcusably poor. 
Id. a t  691-92. 
87. See R. GINSBURG, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SEX-BASED ISCRIMINATION 2 (1974). 
88. The section provided for a reduction of representation in Congress to states which 
denied the right to vote "to any of the male inhabitants of such State" who were 21 and 
citizens. 
89. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, S. REP. NO. 
689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). Section 1 would provide: "Equality of rights under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex." For a discussion of the amendment and its background with references to the already 
extensive literature see R. GINSBURG, CONSTITUTIONAL SPECTS OF SEX-BASED 
D~SCH~M~NATION 107 (1974). 
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the latter, if adopted, will make sex, rather than female sex, a 
suspect, if not virtually forbidden, classification. In any event, 
the area could be clarified if the Court would face the issue di- 
rectly. An explicit determination of the basis for categorizing sex 
as a suspect classification is essential to a rational and consistent 
determination of the question of whether laws favoring females 
are to be upheld. 
3. Illegitimacy 
The Supreme Court has invalidated classifications based on 
illegitimacy in a number of recent cases. In each case the Court 
has purported to apply the general limitation that a classification 
is invalid if not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 
But here, as in the sex cases, the results, as opposed to the rheto- 
ric, of the decisions are consistent with the theory that illegiti- 
macy is a suspect classification. In six of the seven cases before 
it, the Court has held the classification in~a l id .~"  A basis for this 
result is difficult to derive from the Constitution, however, since 
legal preferences for legitimate children, reflecting religious and 
social preferences for traditional family relationships, have a long 
tradition in our law.91 Moreover, some language in these opinions 
suggests that the Court may be in the process of extending consti- 
tutional protection to a particular interest rather than making the 
classification suspect. Thus, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur- 
ety C O . ~ ~  the Court said that imposing 
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the 
bonds of marriage. . . . [on] the head of an infant is illogical 
and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate 
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibil- 
ity or wr~ngdoing.~" 
Again, it would seem that needed clarity would be given this area 
of the law if the Court would directly confront the question of 
whether it is using equal protection to create a suspect classifica- 
90. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U S .  628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. 
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U S .  535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 406 U S .  164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U S .  68 (1968); Glona v. American 
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). A restriction on inheritance by  illegiti- 
mates was upheld in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
91. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 1 (1971). 
92. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
93. Id. a t  175 (footnote omitted). 
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tion, or finding elsewhere in ihe Constitution protection for the 
interest not to be subjected to legal burdens which do not relate 
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. 
4. Wealth 
Despite the Court's assertion in Harper v. Virginia Board of 
ElectionsY4 that "[llines drawn on the basis of wealth or prop- 
erty, like those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored," the 
Court has yet to determine that classifications based on wealth 
are suspect and therefore subject to special scrutiny. In San Anto- 
nio Independent School District v. Rodrigue~,~Vhe Court noted 
that it had "never heretofore held that wealth discrimination 
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny 
. . . ."YWor is it likely that the Court will move in that direction 
since the great bulk of legislation bears differently on individuals 
in relation to their economic status. The Court properly realizes 
that wealth classifications can be challenged only if they impose 
burdens on interests which are protected by the Constitution. 
5. Other Classifications 
The question remaining is whether the Court will categorize 
other classifications based on personal characteristics as constitu- 
tionally suspect. It seems likely that the answer to this question 
is no. Classifications based on age (e.g., laws relating to juveniles, 
compulsory retirement laws, old-age benefits), educational back- 
ground, marital status, and other characteristics of individuals 
are so common that judicial scrutiny based solely on the nature 
of the classification seems both inappropriate and unlikely. 
111. CLASSIFICATIONS BURDENING CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
INTERESTS 
A. The Scope of the Doctrine 
A second aspect of modern equal protection doctrine holds 
that classifications violate the equal protection clause if they bur- 
den constitutionally protected individual interests and are not 
closely related to "compelling" state interests. If a complainant 
shows that a classification "serves to penalize the exercise" of a 
94. 383 U S .  663, 668 (1966). 
95. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
96. Id. at 29. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 
U S .  656, 660 (1973). 
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constitutional "right," the state must show that the classification 
is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest" or 
it will be held invalid.97 The concern in these cases is not with the 
classifying factor, but rather with the importance of the state 
interest asserted and the closeness of the relationship between the 
classification and that interest. Initially, one wonders why it is 
necessary to utilize equal protection at  all when the interest is 
independently protected by the Constitution. If the legislation is 
inconsistent with the constitutional protection already accorded 
the interest, is it not invalid without need for reference to equal 
protection? Is equal protection simply irrelevant or does it extend 
some additional protection? If so, what protection and why? 
When the Supreme Court tests legislation alleged to be in- 
consistent with the constitutional protection accorded to a partic- 
ular interest, it applies two general rules. First, legislation that 
discriminates against constitutionally protected interests will 
normally be held invalid? In some cases, the Court reaches this 
result simply by applying the underlying constitutional provi- 
sion.!" In other cases, it asserts that it is a denial of equal protec- 
tion to single out a constitutionally protected interest for discrim- 
inatory treatment.'" The most difficult task in this area is to 
determine when, if ever, such discriminatory legislation should be 
upheld. In theory, it seems that legislation discriminating against 
a constitutionally protected interest should be upheld only where 
the particular application of the interest involved would uniquely 
harm an important governmental interest? Some of the cases do 
97. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
98. The fact that discriminatory burdens placed on constitutionally protected inter- 
ests will be held invalid, even though the same burdens might not be invalid if imposed 
generally, is best illustrated by a series of tax cases. The Court holds that tax classifica- 
tions generally are presumed constitutional. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts 
Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (upholding statute imposing tax on personal property of corpora- 
tions but not of individuals). Yet i t  holds invalid taxes that discriminate against interstate 
commerce, Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S 389 (1952); against foreign corpo- 
rations which have been admitted to do local business, Whyy v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 
(1968); against the press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and against 
citizens of other states, Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
99. See, E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Welton v. 
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876). 
100. See, e.g., such First Amendment cases as Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
101 (1972); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951); see also Stone, Fora Ameri- 
cana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 272 [hereinafter cited as Stone]; 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. C H I .  L. REV. 20 
(1975). 
101. The privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2 is given such a reading with 
respect to the rights of the citizens of one state in another: 
[The clause] does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where 
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that 
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talk about upholding such legislation when it is "tailored to 
[serve] a substantial governmental interest,"'" but cases ac- 
tually upholding such discrimination are rare.Io3 
The second general rule used in this analysis is that even 
where legislation does not discriminate against a constitutionally 
protected interest, if it burdens such an interest so as to be incon- 
sistent with the constitutional protection accorded the interest, 
the legislation is invalid. Application of this principle frequently 
entails a weighing process, that is, determining whether the state 
interest asserted is sufficiently important to justify the particular 
burden on the protected interest.lo4 In this context, the Court 
often simply states that  if the governmental interest is suffi- 
ciently substantial to justify the burden, then the standard for 
testing the particular relationship is only that of reasonableness. 
In a First Amendment case, for example, the Court has said: "A 
State or municipality may protect individual privacy [the gov- 
ernmental interest] by enacting reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of con- 
tent. "10" 
Use of equal protection in lieu of applying directly the con- 
stitutional provision protecting an interest significantly changes 
the focus of the analysis. Where legislation discriminates against 
a constitutionally protected interest, equal protection analysis 
is irrelevant. If it has any impact, it may be to weaken the pro- 
tection normally accorded to the constitutional interest in- 
they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment 
in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for 
it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons 
do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (footnote omitted); cf. Austin v. New Hamp- 
shire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (invaliding residence 
requirement for abortions). 
102. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972). 
103. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) may be one of those exceptions. 
See the discussion in Stone, supra note 100, a t  275-80. 
104. Balancing is done most overtly in commerce clause cases. See, e.g., Southern 
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). A dispute raged for years in the Supreme Court 
over whether balancing of interests was appropriate in First Amendment cases. For a 
useful survey of that dispute see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1049-54 (9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER]. At any rate, there is little 
doubt that a recurrent theme in First Amendment cases is one of balancing the competing 
interests. 
105. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); see Stone, supra note 100, 
a t  275-80; cf. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (where the balancing may 
have been misplaced). 
891 JUDICIAL SUPERVISION 111 
volved.lo6 In the case of legislation that burdens, but does not 
discriminate against the protected interest, equal protection 
analysis utilizing the compelling state interest standard appears 
to extend greater protection than would be accorded simply by 
applying the substantive constitutional restraint. The Court uses 
the existence of a burden on the constitutionally protected inter- 
est to require the classification to meet the compelling state inter- 
est test without significant concern for the seriousness of that 
burden. Thus, a regulation which imposes even a minor burden 
on a protected interest may be held to require the state to show 
that it has a compelling state interest and that the classification 
is closely related to that interest. The result is to shift attention 
away from determining the scope of the constitutional protection 
accorded the interest and toward simply evaluating the magni- 
tude of the state's interest and the closeness of the relationship 
between the classification and that interest. That this shift in 
attention changes the result is suggested. by the fact that when- 
ever the Court has applied the standard of close relationship to a 
compelling state interest it  has held the legislation invalid.'" 
At an earlier stage, it appeared that the Court was going to 
extend this compelling state interest test to classifications that 
burdened "fundamental" or important interests not expressly 
protected in the text of the Constitution. For example, the Court 
held that although the Constitution did not establish a "right to 
vote" in state elections, regulations imposing restrictions on vot- 
ing would violate equal protection unless shown to be closely 
related to a compelling state interest.'" Advocates urged the 
Court to extend this reasoning to hold that interests such as those 
in welfare and education were sufficiently fundamental to require 
that classifications burdening them be justified as closely related 
to a compelling state interest.'" Had the Court done so, it is 
apparent that it would have been, in effect, extending substan- 
106. Cf. note 143 and accompanying text infra. 
107. Two cases dealing with the regulation of elections appear to be the major excep- 
tions. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
In Storer, the Court appeared to apply a diluted version of the test by requiring that the 
state have a compelling interest, but that the classification need be only reasonably 
related to it. Id. a t  736. See also Buckley v. Valco, 96 S. Ct. 612, 670-72 (1976). 
108. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621,627-30 (1969). The point 
and the cases are discussed in more detail in the next portion of the article. 
109. The strategy on welfare is discussed in Sparer, The Right to Welfare in THE 
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS-WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971). 
In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), it was argued that 
education is a fundamental right which requires the application of the compelling state 
interest doctrine to classifications burdening it. 
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tive constitutional protection to those interests under the guise of 
equal protection. In San  Antonio Independent School District u. 
Rodriguez,Ilo however, the Court refused to take this step. 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive consti- 
tutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of 
the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is 
"fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or 
housing. Nor is it to be found in weighing whether education is 
as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or im- 
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."' 
The initial development of the doctrine that equal protection 
compelled strict scrutiny of classifications that burdened consti- 
tutionally protected interests came in the voting and election 
cases. The history of that development will be examined first, 
followed by a review of the cases dealing with other constitution- 
ally protected interests. 
B. Cases Relating to Voting and Elections 
The Constitution as originally adopted authorized the states 
to establish the qualifications for voting-even for voting for 
members of Congress.It2 But a series of amendments has re- 
stricted that state power. The Fifteenth Amendment forbids 
abridging the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude;" the Nineteenth Amendment, "on ac- 
count of sex." The Twenty-fourth Amendment provides that the 
right to vote for federal officers shall not be denied or abridged 
for the "failure to pay any poll tax or other tax," and the Twenty- 
sixth Amendment provides that the right of citizens 18 years of 
age or older to vote in federal or state elections shall not be denied 
or abridged "on account of age." 
As late as 1959, the Court, in upholding a state literacy test 
for voting, said, "The States have long been held to have broad 
powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suf- 
frage may be exercised . . . absent of course the discrimination 
which the Constitution condemns,"113 but added: 
110. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
111. Id. at 33-34. 
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 2; see Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: 
Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 [hereinafter cited as Casper]. 
113. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959). 
891 JUDICIAL SUPERVISION 113 
We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires 
to adopt may be required of voters. But there is a wide scope 
for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, 
[and] previous criminal record . . . are obvious examples indi- 
cating factors which a State may take into consideration in 
determining the qualifications of voters.*I4 
Four years later the Court began the process of limiting these 
broad state powers. In Gray u. Sanders,Ils invalidating the Geor- 
gia county-unit system of voting, and Reynolds v. Sirn~,~l"equir- 
ing numerical equality for legislative districts, the Court recog- 
nized the power of the states to set general qualifications for 
voting, but held that all citizens possessing those qualifications 
are constitutionally entitled to vote and to have their votes 
counted and weighed equally with those cast by other citizens. In 
Gray the Court referred to such general concepts as the phrase 
"we the people"l17 in the preamble to the Constitution, and the 
"conception of political equality from the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Sev- 
enteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments."ll"n Reynolds, the 
Court stated that the "right to vote freely for the candidate of 
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 
restrictions on that right strike a t  the heart of representative 
government."llg But instead of directly constructing a constitu- 
tionally protected right to vote out of those materials, the Court 
in each case held that the equal protection clause forbade any 
dilution or debasement of the "right to vote." 
Soon after Gray and Reynolds, the Court proceeded to use 
the equal protection clause to restrict the authority of the states 
to impose certain qualifications on voting. Restrictions based on 
military service,120 payment of poll taxes,I2l real property owner- 
114. Id. at  51. 
115. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
116. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
117. 372 U.S. a t  380. 
118. Id. at  381. 
119. 377 U.S. a t  555. 
120. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Again the Court spoke broadly of "mat- 
ters close to the core of our constitutional system," but ultimately held that the limitation 
constituted an "invidious discrimination" in violation of equal protection. Id. at 96. 
121. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Court ignored 
the constitutional history created by the adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment 
proscribing the use of poll taxes in voting for federal officers. The Court appeared to derive 
from equal protection the principle that the power of the states to set qualifications is 
limited to qualifications germane to the voter's "ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process." Id. at  668. 
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ship,ln and duration of residence123 were invalidated because the 
states had not shown that they were closely related to a compel- 
ling state The Court's mode of analysis is best illus- 
trated by Kramer u. Union Free School District No. 15.1294 stat- 
ute which provided that only otherwise qualified voters who were 
either parents of children or owners or lessors of real property 
could vote in school district elections was held violative of equal 
protection. The Court said that " 'any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scruti- 
nized' . . . because statutes distributing the franchise constitute 
the foundation of our representative society."12' Although this 
language might be taken as establishing a constitutionally pro- 
tected interest in voting, the Court went on to say that the consti- 
tutional protection accorded by equal protection is limited to 
legislation which "grants the right to vote to some bona fide resi- 
dents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to 
others. "I2' The Court further indicated that such legislation is 
valid only if "the exclusions are necessary to promote a compel- 
ling state interest."12R 
It  would be difficult for the Court to read into the Constitu- 
tion a constitutionally protected interest in ~ 0 t i n g . I ~ ~  n this area, 
122. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. 
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
123. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
124. The doctrine was also applied in the apportionment cases which are not reviewed 
here. See generally, Casper, supra note 112; Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 
HAW. L. REV. 1111 (1975). 
125. 395 U S .  621 (1969). 
126. Id. at  626. 
127. Id. at 627. 
128. Id. 
For an excellent discussion of the Kramer case see Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the 
Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 
(1973). 
129. The Court's difficulty was highlighted in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court's holding that only interests explicitly or implic- 
itly protected by the Constitution called for strict scrutiny of classifications burdening 
them required an explanation of the voting cases. The Court said in a footnote: "The 
constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can no 
longer be doubted even though . . . 'the right to vote in state elections is nowhere ex- 
pressly mentioned.' " Id. a t  34 n.74. Later the Court noted that "the right to vote, per se, 
is not a constitutionally protected right . . . ." Id. a t  35 n.78. Justice Stewart, concurring, 
said that if there were a right to vote "both the Fifteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth 
Amendment would have been wholly unnecessary." Id. a t  59 n.2. Justice Marshall, dis- 
senting, asked: "I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees . . . the right to 
vote in state elections . . . ." The voting cases and some others were, he said, 
instances in which, due to the importance of the interests a t  stake, the Court 
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more than in almost any other, the people have spoken through 
piecemeal amendments to the Constitution itself. Hence, one can 
understand the reluctance of the Court to find in equal protection 
a general ban on state-imposed qualifications despite its view 
that the "right to vote" is "of the essence of a democratic so- 
ciety"I3" and that "statutes distributing the franchise constitute 
the foundation of our representative society."131 
According the interest in voting partial or indirect protection 
through equal protection is an unsatisfactory solution, however, 
because it focuses attention on the importance of the state's inter- 
est and the relationship of the classification to that interest rather 
than on the relationship between the burden imposed on the in- 
terest in voting and the state interest. The problem is illustrated 
by the most recent voting case, Hill u. Stone.132 There the Court 
had before it a statute providing that to qualify to vote in city 
bond elections one must have "rendered" (listed) any real or 
personal property he might own with the assessor for taxation. 
The burden imposed was not large since any amount of property 
was sufficient to qualify the voter if it was listed, whether or not 
any tax was in fact paid. The state suggested that the purposes 
of the requirement were, first, to extend some protection to prop- 
erty owners who would bear the direct burden of retiring the 
bonded indebtedness and, second, to facilitate enforcement of the 
tax laws. The Court focused its examination on the relationship 
of the classification to the state interests asserted. I t  said that if 
the classification meant that anyone owning property even of 
minimal value could vote, then it would not serve either the inter- 
est of selecting voters in relation to their prospective liability for 
the bonded indebtedness or that of enforcing the state tax laws. 
But had the Court sought to determine whether the statute vio- 
lated a constitutionally protected interest in voting, i t  would have 
more directly emphasized the balance between the magnitude of 
the burden and the importance of the state interest. Under such 
an analysis, acceptance of the state's argument that the impact 
on access to the franchise was minimal could result in the conclu- 
sion that the legislation need only be a reasonable means of satis- 
has displayed a strong concern with the existence of discriminatory state treat- 
ment. But the Court has never said or indicated that these are interests which 
independently enjoy full-blown constitutional protection. 
Id. a t  100. 
130. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
131. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). 
132. 421 U.S. 289 (1975). 
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fying a legitimate but not necessarily "compelling" state interest. 
Thus, the state interest might not need to be so important nor the 
classification so closely related as under the Court's equal protec- 
tion analysis. 
In conclusion, application of the Constitution to regulations 
relating to voting and elections would be greatly facilitated if, 
either by judicial construction or constitutional amendment, di- 
rect constitutional protection were given to the interest in partici- 
pating in the electoral process. 
C. Cases Relating to Travel and Interstate Migration 
The first case in which the Court clearly articulated the doc- 
trine that equal protection requires application of the compelling 
state interest standard to classifications burdening constitution- 
ally protected interests involved the interest in freedom of travel. 
In Shapiro v. Thompson,133 the Court invalidated a law requiring 
a year's residence in the state to qualify for welfare payments. 
The Court reasoned that the Constitution requires "that all citi- 
zens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our 
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unrea- 
sonably burden or restrict this movement."134 The legislative clas- 
sification burdening recent residents could not be justified as a 
means of discouraging indigents from entering the state to obtain 
larger benefits since that purpose is inconsistent with the interest 
in freedom of travel. Other justifications advanced by the state, 
relating largely to administrative problems and the detection of 
fraud, were held insufficient since the classification was not 
closely enough related to the state's purposes. The Court said 
that a mere rational relationship was not enough: 
[I]n moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia 
appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classifi- 
cation which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless 
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental 
interest, is uncon~t i tu t iona l .~~~  
Significantly, the Court did not discuss the extent of the burden 
placed on the interest in freedom of travel or relate that burden 
to the state interests involved. 
133. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
134. Id. at 629. For a recent review of the background and development of the "right 
to travel" see Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1129 
(1975). 
135. 394 U S .  at 634 (1969). 
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In Dunn v. B l u r n ~ t e i n , ~ ~ ~  the Court, in holding invalid a dura- 
tional residence requirement for voting, elaborated on the test to 
be applied. First, the Court said that it is not necessary to show 
that the classification actually deterred travel; the "compelling- 
state-interest test" would be triggered by any classification which 
serves to penalize the exercise of the "right" to travel. Next, i t  
said that the "right" to travel is an unconditional personal right, 
the exercise of which may not be conditioned absent a compelling 
state interest. Finally, in rejecting as insufficient the state inter- 
ests asserted, the Court elaborated on the nature of the compel- 
ling state interest test: 
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational 
residence requirements further a very substantial state interest. 
In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot choose 
means that  unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally 
protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must 
be drawn with "precision," . . . and must be "tailored" to serve 
their legitimate 0bje~tives.l~~ 
The Court was saying that even a minor burden on the interest 
in travel required the state to show both that it had a compelling 
interest and that the classification waslso closely related to that 
objective that it was the least burdensome method available. 
Both Shapiro and Dunn are consistent with a more direct 
approach that makes unnecessary the use of equal protection 
analysis. In each, the Court recognized a constitutionally pro- 
tected interest. I t  referred to the interest as the interest in free- 
dom of travel, but apparently only the narrower interest in free- 
dom of interstate migration was in~olved.'~"n each, the burden 
was placed only on persons who had recently migrated. Therefore, 
the statutes could easily have been held invalid because they 
discriminated against the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
interest, and such discrimination could not be justified since the 
recent residents, as such, did not present any unique evil. In 
136. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
137. Id. at 343 (citation omitted). 
138. The Court recognized this in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U .S. 250, 
(1974): 
[Tjhe right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro. The Court 
was there concerned only with the right to migrate, "with intent to settle and 
abide" or, as the Court put it, "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a 
new life." 
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Dunn, the Court directly articulated this notion: "Durational res- 
idence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to 
travel by imposing their prohibitions only on those persons who 
have recently exercised that right."139 But then, as in Shapiro, the 
Court confused the issue by suggesting that such discriminatory 
legislation might be upheld if necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest. 
The confusion introduced by this unnecessary suggestion, 
that a discriminatory law burdening the exercise of a constitu- 
tionally protected interest can be upheld if necessary to satisfy a 
compelling state interest, was underscored in Memorial Hospital 
v. Maricopa County. 140 In Shapiro and Dunn it was reasonably 
clear tha t  when the Court referred to durational residence re- 
quirements as penalizing the interest in travel, it meant that the 
requirements discriminated against the exercise of the inter- 
est-that is, imposed the burden only on those who had recently 
migrated. But in Memorial Hospital, the Court explained the 
notion of penalty in another way. I t  said that in Shapiro "the 
Court found denial of the basic 'necessities of life' to be a pen- 
alty."lU Accordingly, the Court indicated that a durational resi- 
dence requirement for lower college tuition would be valid, even 
though it was discriminatory and burdened the exercise of the 
interest in migration, since the interest in attending college was 
not as vital as the interest in welfare in Shapiro or medical care 
in Memorial Hospital.142 This is indeed a strange result: to hold 
that  the validity of discriminatory classifications burdening the 
exercise of constitutionally protected interests depends on 
whether or not the classifications burden other interests which are 
not constitutionally protected. 
The confusion thus introduced led the Court to uphold a 
139. 405 U.S. a t  342 (footnote omitted). See also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil 
Service Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 1154 (1976) (holding that a requirement that city employees 
reside in the city did not violate the "right" to travel). 
140. 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974). There the Court held invalid a state statute requiring 
a year's residence in a county as a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or 
medical care at  county expense. Its search for a basis other than discrimination may be 
explained by the fact that the restriction was upon recent residents coming from other 
counties in the state as well as from outside the state. I t  still should be possible, however, 
to interpret the statute as discriminating against migration. The recent resident who had 
come from another state was treated differently than persons who had resided longer in 
the county. The fact that recent residents coming from other counties in the state were 
similarly treated should be irrelevant to the issue. 
141. 415 U S .  a t  259. 
142. The Court was also reacting to dictum in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S .  441, 452 
(1973) suggesting that lower resident tuition fees in state educational institutions could 
be conditioned on durational residence requirements. 
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durational residence requirement for divorce in Sosna v. Iowa.I4" 
The complainant argued that the statute was invalid because "it 
establishes two classes of persons and discriminates against those 
who have recently exercised their right to travel . . . ."I4' Based 
on such precedents as Dunn, Shapiro, and Memorial Hospital, it 
appears that this argument should have been decisive unless the 
state could show that, with respect to determining the crucial 
jurisdictional issue of residence, the recent resident presented 
problems not presented by other residents. The Court, however, 
rejected the argument and proceeded to decide the case as though 
it involved a nondiscriminatory burden on the exercise of the 
interest in freedom of migration. Using the notions developed in 
Memorial Hospital, the Court said that the burden on the com- 
plainant was not as heavy as in the cases involving welfare, vot- 
ing, or medical care since she was not irretrievably foreclosed 
from obtaining some part of what she sought-by waiting she 
could obtain the same divorce decree sought upon her arrival in 
the state. Against this lower burden on the interest, the Court 
said, must be weighed the more substantial state interests in 
insuring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genu- 
inely attached to the state, and in insulating divorce decrees from 
collateral attack. Significantly, the Court spoke neither of com- 
pelling state interests nor of the requirement that the classifica- 
tions be closely tailored to such state interests. 
Sosna leaves this area of the law in a state of complete confu- 
sion-a confusion created mainly by the use of equal protection 
analysis in cases where i t  is neither necessary nor proper. In 
Sosna, equal protection analysis led the Court to uphold a dis- 
criminatory classification burdening the exercise of a constitu- 
tionally protected interest without recognizing the general ap- 
proach in other areas that holds such discrimination unconstitu- 
tional whatever the extent of the burdens imposed. Further, the 
Court appeared to reject the notion that nondiscriminatory stat- 
utes burdening the exercise of constitutionally protected interests 
are invalid, whatever the extent of the burden, unless closely 
related to a compelling state interest. Instead, the Court balanced 
the extent of the burden on the interest in migration against the 
state interests asserted in much the same manner as it does, for 
143. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
144. Id. at 405. 
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example, in First Amendment cases where the burden is not dis- 
criminatory. 14" 
Here, as in the voting cases, both clarity of analysis and 
consistency in result would be achieved if the Court abandoned 
the use of equal protection and decided the cases by determining 
whether the particular legislation conflicts with the constitution- 
ally protected interest in freedom of migration. On this basis, 
most, if not all, durational residence requirements would be 
found invalid as discriminatory burdens upon the exercise of that 
interest. 
D. Cases Relating to Other Constitutionally Protected Interests 
To date, the Court has applied equal protection analysis to 
hold classifications burdening the exercise of constitutionally pro- 
tected interests invalid, unless closely related to compelling state 
interests, only in cases involving voting, elections, and durational 
residence requirements. Whether the Court will discover other 
constitutionally protected interests to which it will apply the rule 
remains to be seen. 
It is worth noting, however, that the Court has recently been 
establishing the contours of a constitutionally protected interest 
in privacy without using the equal protection clause. In a series 
of cases, the Court has held that the interest in privacy is a 
"liberty" protected by the due process clause.lq6 The cases have 
focused on the scope of the protection accorded rather than on the 
classifications and their relationships to the state interests in- 
volved. Nevertheless, the Court has borrowed an approach from 
the equal protection cases. In Roe u. Wade,14' for example, the 
Court analyzed whether forbidding abortions unconstitutionally 
interfered with the interest in privacy as follows: (1) There is a 
145. For an argument that the right to travel should be unhinged from equal protec- 
tion in order to broaden its scope see Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use 
Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564 (1975). For an alternate method to analyze these cases, 
see the suggestion that "newcomers" be regarded as a suspect class in McCoy, Recent 
Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect 
Class? 28 VAND. L. REV. 987 (19%). 
146. See, e .g. ,  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf.  Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Discussion of the constitutional basis and the 
scope of the interest in privacy is beyond the scope of this article. The literature on the 
subject is already enormous. For a useful review of cases and articles see GUNTHER, supra 
note 104, at  616-56. 
147. 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). 
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constitutionally protected interest in privacy. (2) That interest is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy because14R of the significant detriment that would be 
imposed on her by denying her the choice. (3) Since the legisla- 
tion burdens the exercise of this interest in privacy, i t  can be 
sustained only if it is justified by compelling state interests and 
the legislation is narrowly drawn to express only those interests. 
All of this terminology may be no more than an elaborate 
way of saying that the validity of a statute burdening the interest 
in privacy is determined by weighing the extent of the burden 
against the importance of the state interests. If so, the language 
changes nothing.ld9 It may, however, suggest a more mechanical 
approach: if the interest in privacy is burdened, whether substan- 
tially or not, the regulation must be necessary to achieve a com- 
pelling state interest. Such an interpretation would tend to ex- 
tend to the interest in privacy a measure of protection greater 
than that normally accorded other constitutionally protected in- 
terests. 
The most recent case, Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur,lM suggests that the Court may not be departing from the 
normal mode of weighing the state interest against the burden on 
the interest in privacy. In holding invalid mandatory maternity 
leave regulations for pregnant teachers the Court referred to the 
"heavy burden" imposed on the protected interest. Instead of 
speaking in terms of a compelling state interest, it said that the 
"rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge 
upon this vital area of a teacher's constitutional 1iberty."l5l 
148. It is not entirely clear that the word "because" is correct. The Court may have 
been simply asserting that the "right to privacy" included the freedom to have an abor- 
tion. See id. a t  153. 
149. As long ago as Sherber v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), the Court, after 
finding that a statute burdened freedom of religion, said that the question was "whether 
some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's 
First Amendment rights." 
150. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See also the discussion of privacy in Paul v. Davis, 96 S. 
Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976). 
151. Id. at 640. This article does not discuss the recent series of cases holding that 
legislation which creates "permanent irrebuttable presumptions" is subject to strict scru- 
tiny under due process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis 
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). It can be argued that these cases should be analyzed 
as equal protection cases because the emphasis is upon the accuracy of the classification. 
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1534 (1974). But in any event, it appears that this basis for selecting certain regulations 
for strict scrutiny is about to be abandoned by the Court. See the long discussion of the 
issue by the Court in rejecting its application to a social security provision in Weinberger 
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). But cf. Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 96 S. Ct. 249 
(1975). 
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IV. FREEDOM FROM IRRATIONAL C ASSIFICATIONS 
A. Introduction 
The preceding portions of this article have discussed the ap- 
plication of equal protection to cases where the basis for classifi- 
cation is found to be constitutionally proscribed or suspect, and 
to cases where the classification burdens a constitutionally pro- 
tected interest. The question now to be addressed is to what 
extent the equal protection clause also imposes on legislation a 
requirement that classifications be reasonably related to a legiti- 
mate legislative purpose. Does the clause extend constitutional 
protection to an interest in freedom from arbitrary or irrational 
classifications? If so, what is the scope of that protection? 
The analytical problems involved in answering such ques- 
tions are f0rmidab1e.l~~ Suppose that a legislature enacts a law 
with a preamble expressing its concern with the rising accident 
and death rate on the highways, and an operational section im- 
posing a one-year suspension from driving for any person who has 
been twice convicted within a two-year period of either driving in 
excess of the speed limit or reckless driving. Obviously, this clas- 
sification is both underinclusive and over-inclusive with regard to 
the legislative purpose. I t  will not impose suspensions on many 
drivers whose performance on the highways contributes to the 
accident rate and it will suspend some drivers who do not contrib- 
ute to that rate. How does one decide whether classifications of 
this kind are forbidden by the constitutional interest in freedom 
from irrational classifications? 
One can say that here, as with other constitutionally pro- 
tected interests, the courts should balance the state interest in- 
152. A major problem not discussed here is that of determining what legislative 
objective is to be utilized in testing classifications. See the excellent discussion of the 
problem in Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 
(1972). The author notes: 
It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way 
that the statutory classification is rationally related to it. When a statute names 
a class, that class must share some common characteristic for that is the defini- 
tional attribute of a "class." The nature of the burdens or benefits created by a 
statute and the nature of the chosen class's commonality will always suggest a 
statutory purpose-to so burden or benefit the common trait shared by members 
of the identified class. A statute's classifications will be rationally related to 
such a purpose because the reach of the purpose has been derived from the 
classifications themselves. 
Id. a t  128 (footnotes omitted). The author concludes that courts "do not in fact use the 
rationality requirement to strike down statutes, because it is impossible to do so." Id. at 
154. 
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volved against the interest in freedom from irrational classifica- 
tions. How should that balance be struck, or the balancing model 
constructed? There are a t  least five possibilities. The Court could 
balance (1) the level of irrationality of the legislation-the extent 
to which the classification departs from perfect correlation with 
the legislative purpose-against the state interest in maintaining 
the normal political processes in our democratic society (which 
necessarily produce less-than-perfect classifications); (2) the 
level of irrationality against the state interest in economy and 
efficiency achieved by making the particular classifications; (3) 
the level of irrationality against the nature and extent of the 
burden on the individual affected by the classification (e.g., if the 
individual is imprisoned or denied welfare or education, the clas- 
sifications would have to be more rational than if his business 
were made less profitable or his property less valuable); (4) the 
level of irrationality against the invidiousness of the basis upon 
which the classification is drawn (e.g., a classification based on 
lack of wealth would have to be more rational than one based on 
ability to pass a driving test); and (5) the importance of the state 
interest being served by the legislation against the nature and 
extent of the burden on the individual, or the relative "invidious- 
ness" of the classification. 
B. Level of Irrationality v. State Interest in  Maintenance of 
Normal Political Processes 
Equal protection has a minimal impact when the balance is 
between the level of irrationality and the state interest in main- 
taining the normal political processes. Under this analysis, al- 
most all legislation is upheld. Posner has recently presented the 
argument for this position,lJ3 asserting that the legislative process 
does not attempt to promote some general conception of the pub- 
lic good: 
Many public policies are better explained as the outcome of a 
pure power struggle-clothed in a rhetoric of public interest that 
is a mere figleaf-among narrow interest or pressure groups. The 
ability of such groups to obtain legislation derives from their 
money, votes, cohesiveness, ability to make credible threats of 
violence or other disorder if their demands are not met, and 
other factors all totally unrelated to the abstract merit of the 
policy at  issue.i54 
153. Posner, supra note 39, at 27-28. 
154. Id. at 27. 
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From this he concludes that it is a mistake to require as a consti- 
tutional standard 
that legislation, to withstand a challenge based on alleged arbi- 
trariness or discrimination, be reasonably related to some gen- 
eral social goal. The real "justification" for most legislation is 
simply that it is the product of the constitutionally created pol- 
itical process of our s0~ i e ty . l~~  
Tussman and t e n B r ~ e k , I ~ ~  in their pioneering article a 
quarter of a century ago, took the opposite approach. They recog- 
nized that political considerations result in legislative classifica- 
tions that are not closely related to a general legislative objective 
because of the necessity to accommodate the conflicting interests 
of various groups: 
If we accept the pressure group theory, a law is properly the 
resultant of pressures exerted by competing interests . . . . The 
demand for equal laws becomes meaningless in this context. 
The legislature, on this view, is simply the focal point of compet- 
ing forces-a social barometer faithfully registering pressures. 
Can the Court demand of a barometer that it ignore pressure?157 
Nevertheless, they asserted that the constitutional protection of 
equal laws is a constitutional command that the legislatures rise 
above such pressures and serve the general good, and that "the 
triumph of private or group pressure marks the corruption of the 
legislative process." Hence, they concluded that "legislative sub- 
mission to political pressure does not constitute a fair reason for 
failure to extend the operation of a law to those similarly situated 
whom it leaves untouched."158 
It appears that the Court follows the Posner approach with 
respect to most legislation challenged under the equal protection 
clause. In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New Y0r12,l~~ the Court 
said that it is by "practical considerations based on experience 
rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of 
equal protection is to be answered." In McGowan u. Maryland,16o 
155. Id. at 28-29. Posner does suggest that there may be "extreme cases of discrimina- 
tory state action" which are so "palpably inconsistent" with equal protection as to be 
unconstitutional, "such as forbidding left-handed people to obtain drivers' licenses in 
order to reduce automobile pollution." Id. at 29 n.56. 
156. Tussman & tenBroek, The Eqwll Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 
(1949). 
157. Id. at 350. 
158. Id. 
159. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). 
160. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
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the Court said that the states are permitted 
[a] wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some 
groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional 
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds 
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. 
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their con- 
stitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws 
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be 
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify it.I6l 
Thus, the Court strikes down few classifications as irrational be- 
cause it could do so 
only if we substituted our judgment on the facts of which we can 
be only dimly aware for a legislative judgment that reflects a 
vivid reaction to pressing fiscal problems. . . . We cannot [do 
this] and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review, 
which is an important part of our constitutional tradition.I6* 
C. Level of Irrationality v. State Interest in  Economy and 
Eficiency 
The second possibility, that the level of irrationality should 
be balanced against the state interest in economy and efficiency 
in government, is closely related to the first. The emphasis here 
is on the relative costs of attempting to classify people by charac- 
teristics closely related to the legislative purpose, as opposed to 
using a less rational but more easily applied classification. Thus, 
a state could justify a requirement that one pass a bar examina- 
tion to practice law, although the process will exclude some who 
would make good lawyers and include some who would not, since 
means more closely related to individual fitness are much more 
expensive and introduce greater possibilities of individual judg- 
ments based on inadmissible factors. 
The Court has recently used this approach to limit the line 
of cases holding that statutes making conclusive presumptions 
161. Id. at 425-26. This same approach will be found in a number of more recent 
cases. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U S .  1 (1974); North Dakota State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores Inc., 414 U S .  156 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake 
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US.  356 (1973). 
162. Id. a t  365. There are approximately 23 cases since 1947 in which the Court has 
purported to apply only a standard of rational relationship and has held legislation uncon- 
stitutional thereunder. Ten of these cases involved classifications based on sex or illegiti- 
macy. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION F THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, S. DOC. NO. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1597-1783 (1973). 
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are normally invalid. In Welnberger v. Salfi,Ia the Court upheld 
a provision in the Social Security Act imposing a duration-of- 
relationship requirement for wives and stepchildren of deceased 
wage earners, saying: 
[Tlhe question raised is not whether a statutory provision pre- 
cisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual 
position which generated the congressional concern reflected in 
the statute. . . . Nor is the question whether the provision fil- 
ters out a substantial part of the class which caused congres- 
sional concern, or whether it filters out more members of the 
class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its 
concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an  
abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally 
have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification 
would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and 
other difficulties of individual determinations justified the in- 
herent imprecision of a prophylactic r ~ 1 e . l ~ ~  
How much more rigorous the judicial review inherent in this ap- 
proach is than that inherent in the balancing of the level of irra- 
tionality against the realities of the legislative process depends, 
of course, upon how much deference to legislative judgment the 
Court intended by the phrase "could rationally have con- 
cluded. 
D. Level of Irrationality v. Nature and Extent of Burden 
Problems of a different nature arise if it is held that the 
balance is between the level of irrationality of the classification 
and the nature and extent of the burden placed upon the person 
attacking the classification. On what principled basis can the 
Court sort out the individual interests that require more precise 
classifications from those that do not? The Court often refers to 
the difference between legislation affecting "personal" interests 
and legislation affecting "economic and social" interests. To the 
extent that this means that personal interests protected under 
some other constitutional provision merit a close examination of 
and balancing against legislative interests affecting them, there 
is no difficulty. But to the extent that it means, as Justice Mar- 
163. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
164. Id. at 777. 
165. Cf. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAW. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. REV. 269 
(19%). 
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shall has often suggested in dissenting opinions,Yhat the Court 
should weigh the societal importance of interests that are not 
otherwise constitutionally protected, the distinction presents 
genuine problems as to the scope of judicial review. Why should 
the Court decide, for example, whether legislation limiting educa- 
tional opportunities is more important than legislation limiting 
the occupancy of houses to single families, with the result that a 
classification in the first case must be more. closely related to a 
legitimate legislative purpose than in the second? Certainly, 
equal protection analysis does not help answer the q ~ e s t i o n . ~ ~ '  
E. Level of Irrationality v. Nature of Classifying Factor 
Similar problems arise when the balance is between the level 
of irrationality of the classification and the nature of the classify- 
ing factor being used. As we have seen, the Court has found that 
race, nationality, and alienage are constitutionally suspect classi- 
fications. With respect to sex and illegitimacy, however, the 
Court has said that it need not decide whether they are suspect 
classifications because it has been able to find the classifications 
used to be irrational and arbitrary. Yet a reading of the cases 
makes i t  clear that the Court's real objection has been to the 
classifying factor, with the result that in sex and illegitimacy 
cases the Court requires legislatures to use classifications more 
closely related to a legislative purpose than it would with respect 
to legislation using other classifying factors. 168 The question, then, 
becomes one of deciding whether equal protection is restricted to 
a limited number of classifications considered suspect or whether 
it permits the Court to rank (perhaps along a scale with an infi- 
nite number of gradations) classifying factors, some requiring 
more precision in classification than others. 
166. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432 (1974); San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519 (1970). 
167. For the view that the Court should balance the competing policies see Note, 
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 154 (1972): 
Because the disputes that arise under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause 
have to do with the relative merits of competing public policies, judicial deci- 
sions obscure the central issues in such cases to the extent that they are based 
on discussions of a statute's rationality. The nature of the conflict between the 
political values a t  stake as well as the underlying bases of judicial reasoning 
would be made more explicit if the competing public policies were weighed 
outright without diversionary discussions regarding a statute's rationality. 
168. See the discussion in Section 11, supra. 
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F. Importance of  State Objective v. Nature and Extent of 
Burden or Nature of  Classifying Factor 
Finally, one must consider whether in cases such as these the 
Court should also weigh the importance of the state objective. 
The Court has not yet purported to do so. Instead, as Gunther has 
noted,169 in recent cases in which the Court has invalidated stat- 
utes purportedly under the rational basis standard, it has re- 
quired that the classification substantially further-be more than 
minimally related to-the state objective, and that the objective 
be a real rather than an imagined or illusory one. Justice Mar- 
shall himself, in his dissenting pleas for the Court to apply a 
spectrum of standards, has not clearly said that the importance 
of the state objective must be weighed in the balance when nei- 
ther a constitutionally protected interest nor a suspect classifica- 
tion is involved.170 Indeed, the Court has been concerned with the 
importance of the state objective only in those cases where the 
Court was in fact identifying either an interest as constitutionally 
protected171 or a classifying factor as suspect.172 
G. Future of the Irrationality Approach 
The most important issue posed for the future is the extent 
to which the Court will move to require the states to show that 
legislative classifications bear more than a minimal relationship 
to an articulated, or possibly even genuine, legislative purpose. 
Will the Court develop a calculus of interests that, although not 
169. GUNTHER, supra note 104, a t  661-63. For an excellent discussion of the range of 
problems suggested in this section see id. a t  657-90. See also Gunther, Foreword: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); cf. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal 
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 
1071 (1974). 
170. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 124 (1973): 
The nature of our inquiry into the justifications for state discrimination is 
essentially the same in all equal protection cases: We must consider the substan- 
tiality of the state interests sought to be served, and we must scrutinize the 
reasonableness of the means by which the State has sought to advance its 
interests. 
Justice Marshall goes on to say that the compelling state interest standard applies when 
constitutionally protected interests are burdened. He does not clarify whether in other 
cases the close scrutiny should go only to the identification of the state interest and the 
relation of the classification to it or whether the importance of the state interest should 
also be weighed. 
171. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting). 
172. E.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (sex classification). 
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otherwise accorded constitutional protection, require "more per- 
fect" classifications when they are burdened? Recent cases sug- 
gest that the Court will not adopt the Marshall formulations. 
Enormous problems of workload will result if the door is opened 
to imaginative counsel to seek court review of wider and wider 
areas of 1egi~lation.l~~ Furthermore, the Court is uncomfortable 
with openly determining that some interests are to be accorded 
more constitutional protection than others without a point of 
constitutional reference more precise than the equal protection 
clause. But the pressures to find some basis for invalidating 
"bad" legislation will continue to be felt, and one can expect the 
Court from time to time to seize upon the irrationality of classifi- 
cations as a basis for expressing its displeasure with the substance 
of such legislation. 17* 
What, then, should be the role for equal protection? What 
limitations can it fairly be said to impose on the legislative pro- 
cess? 
First, history makes it clear that the equal protection clause 
was intended to invalidate legislation singling out the black race 
for special burdens. From this, there is little difficulty in general- 
izing a similar protection for other racial and national groups that 
have suffered a history of community discrimination. To con- 
clude that all classifications based on race or nationality are con- 
stitutionally suspect extends the reach of this interpretation 
somewhat further, but certainly not unacceptably so. The current 
dispute over the validity of "benign discrimination" poses 
- - - -- 
173. No attempt has been made in this article to review the cases in the lower federal 
courts and the state courts where the workload problem will appear. The extent to which 
some courts are willing to use equal protection analysis to invalidate ordinary legislative 
choices is indicated by the experience with automobile guest statutes. The California 
Supreme Court held the California guest statute invalid as not bearing a substantial and 
rational relationship to what the court conceived to be the legislative purposes. Brown v. 
Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1973). The mixed reception that 
this opinion received in other courts is reviewed in Comment, T h e  Constitutionality of 
Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 
B.Y.U.L. REV. 99. In a later opinion upholding another portion of the California guest 
statute, the California court indicated the need to  restrict the expansive role it had 
assumed in applying equal protection. Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 546 P.2d 1033, 
128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976). 
174. For a quite different point of view regarding the issues treated in this section 
and in portions of the other sections see Goodpaster, T h e  Constitution and Fundamental 
Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479 (1973). 
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sharply the question whether the special protection is accorded 
to all races or only to those that have suffered community dis- 
crimination. An even broader reach of interpretation is involved 
in the question of whether other criteria, such as alienage, sex, 
and illegitimacy, should be treated as constitutionally suspect. 
The Court has so held with respect to alienage, but has purported 
not to decide the issue for classifications based on sex and illegiti- 
macy. It appears, however, that the Court is in fact treating fem- 
ale sex and illegitimacy as suspect classifications. 
Second, equal protection has no significant role to play with 
respect to classifications burdening constitutionally protected 
interests. Legislation discriminating against such interests can 
be, and often has been, invalidated without using equal protec- 
tion analysis. Legislation that burdens such interests but does not 
discriminate against them is normally tested by balancing the 
importance of the state interest against the extent of the burden 
on the protected interest. Those cases suggesting that a mere 
showing of any burden on a constitutionally protected interest 
requires the state to demonstrate that the classification is closely 
tailored to a compelling state interest constitute a misapplication 
of the equal protection doctrine. That misapplication may divert 
attention away from the normal process of balancing the magni- 
tude of the burden on the protected interest against the import- 
ance of the state interest served. This relatively recent aspect of 
equal protection analysis, one applied in only a narrow range of 
cases, should be abandoned as unnecessary and confusing. 
Third, a major question remains unresolved regarding the 
extent to which equal protection extends protection to an interest 
in freedom from irrational classification. In fact, the Court rarely 
overturns legislative classifications merely because they are 
found to be irrational. Recent cases indicate that the Court may 
be examining more closely classifications that impinge on a vari- 
ety of personal interests not otherwise accorded constitutional 
protection. This trend raises significant and difficult problems to 
the extent that it portends any substantial degree of judicial su- 
pervision of the classifications contained in the vast outpourings 
of federal and state legislatures. Its continuance would pose prob- 
lems both of legitimacy and workload for the Court. One can 
therefore predict that judicial use of the equal protection clause 
to invalidate legislation not involving either suspect classifica- 
tions or burdens on constitutionally protected interests will, as in 
the past, be a relatively unusual event. 
